KETEP 세계에너지시장정보

1. Introduction: The current call for electricity market design reform in the EU 1
1.1 What happened? 1
1.2 How did policy makers react? 1
1.3 Why reform the EU power market design? 2
1.4 Regulation, not policy 3
2. A brief evaluation of the existing EU power market design 4
2.1 Spot markets doing their job 5
2.2 Long-term markets never really did 6
3. Interventions in wholesale power markets 7
3.1 Which interventions minimally interfere with the efficient short-run dispatch? 7
3.2 How to distribute the revenue from any intervention without distorting saving incentives 11
4. A power market reform: How to “complete” the market design? 12
4.1 Two different problems that cannot be tackled with a single tool 12
4.2 Investment risk management 13
4.3 Lack of adequate hedging of end users against periods of sustained high prices 16
5. The counterparty of the long-term hedges 19
6. Long-term contracts for new RES 21
6.1 Auctions to enhance competition for accessing the network 21
6.2 Long-term hedge contract design for newly connecting RES: Well-designed CfDs 22
7. Long-term contracts for existing generation 26
7.1 Negotiated long-term contracts 27
7.2 Price regulation: Explicit, implicit, permanent revenue cap, and price cap 27
7.3 Procurement of AOs 29
8. Conclusions and policy recommendations 31
Bibliography 33
Appendix A: A product to address affordability concerns: Affordability options 38