KETEP 세계에너지시장정보

Abstract 5

1 Introduction 6

2 Multipollutant Cap-and-Trade Matching Model 8
 2.1 Overview 8
 2.2 Theoretical Model 9
  2.2.1 Heterogeneous Distribution of Polluting Firms 9
  2.2.2 Portfolio of Multipollutant Permits Issued by the Regulator 9
  2.2.3 Value of Matching Heterogeneous Polluting Firms with Multipollutant Permits 11

3 Competitive Equilibrium and Market Segmentation in a Multipollutant Cap-and-Trade Market 13
 3.1 Defining the Multipollutant Equilibrium Market 13
  3.1.1 Decentralized Equilibrium in a Multipollutant Cap-and-Trade Market 14

4 Socially Efficient Allocations of Permits in the Multipollutant Cap-and-Trade System 21
 4.1 TheMultipollutant Optimal Transport Problem 21
 4.2 Dual Formulation of the Multipollutant Optimal Transport Problem 24

5 Decentralization of Optimal Multipollutant Allocation 28

6 Stability of Multipollutant Cap-and-Trade Markets Under Changes in Permit Portfolios 28
 6.1 Regularity Conditions for Stability 29
 6.2 Stability of Multipollutant Permit Prices 30
 6.3 Policy Implications of the Stability Results in the Multipollutant Optimal Transport Problem 34

7 Numerical Approach and Algorithm for Tackling Multipollutant Cap-and-Trade Markets 35
 7.1 Convergence to Equilibrium in Multipollutant Markets 35
 7.2 Example of Simulation of a Multipollutant Cap-and-Trade Market 36

8 Does an Equivalence Exist Between Primary Markets for Multipollutant Permits and Clustered Secondary Markets for Individual Pollutant Rights? 39
 8.1 Implicit Prices and Market Dimensionality 39
 8.2 Practical Implications for Policymakers 40
 8.3 Secondary Clustered Markets: A Practical Alternative 40
 8.4 Information Loss and Dimensionality Challenges in Secondary Markets for Individual Pollutant Rights 41

9 Concluding Remarks 42